Metonymy and Conceptual Blending
Seana Coulson and Todd Oakley
1. General Definitions of Conceptual Blending
Conceptual
blending theory offers a general model of meaning construction in which a small
set of partially compositional processes operate in analogy, metaphor,
counterfactuals, and many other semantic and pragmatic phenomena. Discussed at length in Fauconnier &
Turner (1998), Coulson (2000), and Oakley (in preparation) blending involves a
set of operations for combining dynamic cognitive models in a network of mental
spaces (Fauconnier, 1994), or partitions of speakers' referential
representations. Below, we discuss the
role of metonymy in a range of conceptual blends that span a continuum from
instances of ordinary language use to examples of human creativity and artistry
operating at its highest pitch. Our
examples include uses of the idiom blowing your own horn, literary
blends in the writings of the American author Ernest Hemingway, and metonymic
blends in the sculpture of Viktor Schreckengost.
1.1 Mental Space Theory
Mental spaces
contain partial representations of the entities and relationships in any given
scenario as perceived, imagined, remembered, or otherwise understood by a
speaker. Elements represent each of the
discourse entities, and simple frames represent the relationships that exist
between them. Because the same scenario
can be construed in multiple ways, mental spaces are frequently used to
partition incoming information about elements in speakers' referential
representations.
(1) Seana thinks
the statue is hideous, but Todd thinks it's just wonderful.
For example, (1)
prompts the reader to construct two mental spaces, one to represent Seana's
opinion of the statue, and one to represent Todd's:
Seana Todd
Thinks Thinks
====== ======
s s'
hideous(s) wonderful(s')
One virtue of
mental space theory is that it explains how the addressee might encode
information at the referential level by dividing it into concepts relevant to
different aspects of the scenario.
However, by partitioning the information, this method also creates a
need to keep track of the relationships that exist between counterpart elements
and relations represented in different mental spaces.
Consequently, the
notion of mappings between mental spaces is a central component of both
mental space theory and the theory of conceptual blending. A mapping, or mental space
connection, is the understanding that an object or element in one mental
space corresponds to an object or element in another. For example in (1), the sentence about Seana and Todd's
respective opinions about the statue, there is an identity mapping between the
element s that represents the statue in Seana's opinion space, and
element s' that represents the statue in Todd's opinion space. The mental spaces framework thus allows one
to represent the fact that the very same statue is referred to in "the
statue is hideous" and "it's just wonderful," in spite of its
disparate properties in the two opinion spaces.
Besides identity,
such mappings can be based on a number of relationships, such as similarity,
analogy, and other pragmatic functions.
Once linked, the access principle allows speakers to refer to an
element in one space by naming, describing, or referring to its counterpart in
another space. Interestingly, part of
Fauconnier's (1994) justification for the access principle allowing reference
across different spaces was the existence of similar connectors operating
within a single mental space. For
example, Fauconnier suggests that a pragmatic function linking hospital
patients to their medical conditions licenses the metonymic reference to the
patient in (2).
(2) The gastric
ulcer in room 12 would like some coffee.
Just as pragmatic
functions connecting (say) patients and their illnesses can allow speakers to
access and refer to an associated element in the same mental space (see
Nunberg, 1978 for extensive review of pragmatic functions), cross-space
mappings based on identity and analogy can allow speakers to access and refer
to one element by naming or describing its counterpart in a completely
different space.
1.2 Conceptual Blending Theory
A development of
mental space theory, the theory of conceptual blending was set up to account
for cases such as (3) in which some of the content of two or more mental spaces
is combined to yield emergent structure.
(3) Coke Flows
Past Forecasts: Soft drink company posts gains
This deceptively
simple headline involves a combination of a conventionalized metonymy between a
corporation (Coca Cola, Inc.) and the signature product of that corporation, as
well as a metaphoric construal of Coca Cola, Inc.'s profits in the first
quarter of 2001. Although metonymic reference occurs in both (2) and (3), the
meaning construction in (3) is slightly more complicated. Example (2) relies on a metonymic link
between a patient and his condition to access the patient, and the phrase
"wants some coffee" is a perfectly appropriate predication for the
patient (albeit not a healthy one given his condition). In (3), by contrast, "flows past
forecasts" is an appropriate metaphoric predication for the Coca
Cola corporation's profit, and an appropriate literal predication for
the Coca Cola corporation's best known product. So, while the "Coke" in (3) is mainly construed as a
corporation, it would appear to have some of the properties of the soft drink
that corporation produces.
1.2.1 Conceptual Integration Networks
In conceptual
blending theory, the way in which the meaning of "Coke" in (3)
appeals simultaneously to conceptual structure from multiple domains is
captured in a conceptual integration network (CIN). A CIN is an array of mental spaces in which
the processes of conceptual blending unfold (Fauconnier & Turner,
1998). These networks consist of two or
more input spaces structured by information from discrete cognitive
domains, an optional generic space that contains structure common to all
spaces in the network, and a blended space that contains selected aspects
of structure from each input space, and frequently, emergent structure of its
own. Blending involves the
establishment of partial mappings between cognitive models in different spaces
in the network, and the projection of conceptual structure from space to space.
The CIN to
represent (3) involves 2 input spaces, a soft drink space, and a corporation
space. In the soft drink space, an
element d is set up to represent "Coke", and is structured by
a frame for soft drinks (viz. the element d is construed as having the
properties of the sugary, carbonated beverage drunk by millions of people every
day). In the corporation space, c'
represents the Coca Cola corporation that manufactures Coke. Though the
beverage and the company that makes the beverage have very different
properties, the elements d' and c' are linked by a conventional
metonymy that allows corporations to be identified by their products. The corporation space also includes an
element p' that represents the profit generated by Coca Cola, Inc. during
the first quarter of 2001, and f' to represent the predicted profit for
the same quarter (viz. the economic forecast). Conceptual structure in the
corporation space involves a frame for corporate profit, and for evaluating
corporate profits. Moreover, a conventional metonymy between corporations and
their profits links elements c' and p'.
Soft
Drink Corporation
Input Input
========= ==========
d d'
c'
p'
f'
The blended space
in this network contains element c* linked by identity to d in
the soft drink space, and by metonymy to p' (in the corporation
space). While conceptual structure in
the input spaces comes from the domains of soft drinks and corporations, the
blended space includes partial structure from each of the inputs as well as
emergent structure of its own.
Consequently, element c* has some of the properties of Coke (in
that it is a liquid), and some of the properties of Coca Cola, Inc.'s first
quarter 2001 profit (in that it was greater than the forecasted profit).
Besides the
hybrid soft-drink/profit element, the blend in (3) is notable in the way that
it recruits c*'s amalgam of properties to construe the relationship
between Coca Cola's actual and predicted profit. Objectively considered, the relationship between actual and
predicted profit is a static mathematical one.
However, the use of the verb "flowed" suggests (3) is a
description of motion. This phenomenon,
known as fictive (or abstract, or subjective) motion has been well-studied by
Langacker (1987) and Talmy (2000). In
addition, Fauconnier (1997) has noted that fictive motion constructions involve
a blend between an abstract motion scenario and a static representation of the
relationship between two or more objects referred to in the particular
construction at hand.
(4) The
blackboard goes all the way to the wall.
For example, (4)
involves a blend of a static construal of the spatial extent of the blackboard
(spatial input) with an abstract, image schematic, understanding of a trajector
that moves relative to a reference point, or landmark. There is a mapping between the blackboard
and the trajector and these two elements are fused in the blended space.
Similarly, there is a mapping between the wall and the landmark, and these two
elements are fused in the blended space.
In the motion input, the trajector's motion ends at the landmark.
Similarly, in the blended space, the motion of the blackboard/trajector ends at
the wall/landmark. The path of motion
can then be mapped onto the spatial input to be construed as the spatial extent
of the blackboard.
Spatial Blended Motion
Input
Space Input
====== ====== ======
blackboard blackboard/trajector trajector
wall wall/landmark landmark
(static) (motion) (motion)
The fictive
motion in (3) can be analyzed similarly by including a third input space to the
CIN (see figure 1). The third input is
structured by a schematic characterization of the fictive motion schema in
which a trajector moves along an abstract path with a reference point (as in
Fauconnier, 1997).
Soft
Drink Corporation Motion
Input Input Input
========= ========== ======
d d'
c'
p' t" (trajector)
f' l" (landmark)
For the fictive
motion construal, the most important mappings are between p', the profit
in the corporate input, and t", the trajector in the motion input,
and between f', the forecast in the corporate input, and l",
the landmark in the motion input.
Elements p' and t" are mapped onto c* in the
blend. Similarly, f' and r
are mapped onto f*. A static relationship between the actual and the
predicted profit is thus construed as the abstract motion of the blended
soft-drink/profit/trajector c* element past the blended
forecast/landmark f* element.
The implications
that the spatial relationships between elements in the blended space have for
their counterparts in the economic space are rooted in conventional metaphoric
mappings between progress and movement along a path (see Lakoff, 1993 for
review). Consequently, the motion of c* past f* (viz. the
movement of the Coke past the forecast/reference point) can be construed as
Coke's actual profits exceeding their predicted profits. The expression of a static mathematical
relationship in terms of motion results from conceptual blending, a process
ultimately aimed at allowing conceptual structure from connected mental spaces
to be integrated in a single cognitive model.
Moreover, the particular verbiage of (3) – the expression of fictive
motion in the domain of liquids – is possible only because of a chain of
metonymies from products to the corporations that make them, and from
corporations to the profits they earn.
The point here is
that natural language constructions (in this case a headline from the business
page of USA Today, a widely read American newspaper) frequently combine
metonymic and metaphoric mappings not only to exploit inferential structure
available in the trigger spaces (in the sense of Fauconnier, 1994 and Nunberg,
1978), but to combine structure from multiple triggers in novel ways. Coulson & Oakley (2000), for example,
discuss the blending in the headlines "Tennessee Tramples Kentucky"
and "Overseas Ballots Boost Bush" which involve conventional metonymies
between states and universities, universities and their football teams,
politicians and their votes, as well as metaphoric mappings between combat and
sports, and between greater quantities and greater heights. One advantage of the blending framework is
that it allows the treatment of examples like (3) that require many sorts of
conceptual mappings to be set up in parallel in the course of meaning
construction.
2. Optimality Principles
The
"products" of these parallel mappings, however, are more influential
when they adhere to a set of specific principles known as the optimality
principles, a set of constraints under which blends are most effective. Fauconnier & Turner (1998) argue for 6
such optimality principles: (i) the integration principle, that
representations in the blended space can be manipulated as a single unit; (ii)
the topology principle, that relations in the blend should match the
relations of their counterparts in other spaces; (iii) the web principle
that the representation in the blended space should maintain mappings to the
input spaces; (iv) the unpacking principle, that given a blended model,
the interpreter should be able to infer the structure in other spaces in the
network; (v) the good reason principle that creates pressure to
attribute significance to elements in the blend; and (vi) metonymic
tightening that when metonymically related elements are projected into the
blended space, there is pressure to compress the "distance" between
them.
Despite their
poetic names, most of these principles invoke standard pressures that obtain in
all mapping problems (see Hofstadter, 1995 for review). The topology principle, for example, exerts
normative pressure to construct and maintain mappings in such a way as to
preserve relational structure. In
research on analogical reasoning, this pressure is referred to as the structure
mapping principle (see Gentner & Markman, 1997 for review). In research on metaphorical mapping, this
pressure is referred to as the invariance hypothesis, the observation that the
underlying mappings in metaphoric expressions are almost always based on shared
image schematic structure (see Brugman, 1990; Lakoff 1990; and Turner, 1990).
The web principle, that the representation in the blended space should maintain
its mappings to the input spaces, amounts to the extension of the access
principle to conceptual content in blended mental spaces. Satisfaction of the web principle is what
allows one to access elements in the blend with names and descriptions from the
input spaces, as well as what allows the projection of structure from the
blended space to other spaces in the network.
Finally, the unpacking principle, the dictate that given a blended
model, the listener should be able to construct structure in the other spaces
in the network, can be thought of as pressure to use conventional mapping
schemas that facilitate comprehension.
Thus construed, the unpacking principle applies pressure to use
conceptual metaphors, such as the link between seeing and knowing, and
conventional metonymic mappings, such as part-for-whole, producer-for-product,
or container-for-contents.
The integration
principle, the good reason principle, and the metonymic tightening principle
all specifically refer to the blended space, and consequently, are unique to
Fauconnier & Turner's theoretical framework. However, we note that the integration principle, pressure to
conceptualize the event with an easily manipulable representation, is reminiscent
of Miller's (1957) concept of chunking, as well as its more formal incarnation
in Anderson's (1983) ACT-* model.
Chunking is a process by which one can assimilate a great deal of new
information by relating it to knowledge representations in long-term memory. Fauconnier & Turner's insight in blending
theory is that comprehenders can "chunk" information by relating it
to various juxtapositions of partial structure from multiple domains.
The optimality
principles get their name from a paradigm in phonology that explains
phonological regularities by recourse to a set of interacting constraints. Like their namesake, satisfaction of
Fauconnier and Turner's optimality principles is selective, and satisfaction of
one constraint is often inconsistent with the satisfaction of another. For example, the blend in (3) fulfills the
integration principle because the cognitive model set up in the blend concerns
a single scene (of Coke literally flowing past the forecast). However, it
violates the topology principle because element c* in the blended space
maps onto both c' and p' in the corporation space. We suggest that metonymic expressions often
embody this tradeoff between the topology principle, that is, the dictate that
models in each of the mental spaces in the network share as much relational
structure as possible, and the integration principle, that is, the dictate that
the events in the blended space form an integrated mental scene. In general,
the presence of metonymic connections in the blend performs the crucial
function of holding together the network of mental spaces that are necessary
for reasoning on a particular topic to be sustained over time.
3. Metonymic Shifts
In their book Mental
Leaps, Holyoak and Thagard (1995) claim that the difference between
metaphor and analogy is that metaphors, especially literary ones, are subject
to "loose" and "shifting" mappings which are the
side-effects of metonymy. Treating it
as a somewhat suspect technique, Holyoak & Thagard argue that metonymy's
intrusion into metaphoric language places metaphor outside the explanatory
bounds of a theory of analogy. An
unbridled force at large in the literary universe, metonymy leads at best to
analogical inconsistency, at worst to incoherence. In support of their position, Holyoak & Thagard point to the
following excerpt from the writings of Ernest Hemingway:
His talent was as natural as the pattern that was made by the dust
on a butterfly's wings. At one time he
understood it no more than the butterfly did and he did not know when it was
brushed or marred. Later he became conscious of his damaged wings and of their
construction and he learned to think and could not fly anymore because the love
of flight was gone and he could only remember when it had been effortless
(Cited in Holyoak & Thagard, 1995:224).
Analyzing the
passage, Holyoak & Thagard point to the fact that the writer's talent is
initially mapped to the pattern of dust on the butterfly's wings, and later to
the wings themselves. Further, they
point out that there is no causal relationship between patterns on a
butterfly's wings and its ability to fly, and no reason why consciousness of
wings should affect the butterfly's ability to fly. In blending theory,
analogical mismatches like this are frequently used to motivate the need for a
blended space analysis. Indeed, in their discussion of this example, Holyoak
& Thagard resort to the use of slashes to represent the conceptual fusion
of ideas: "A butterfly's pattern is not causally related to its flight, so
if talent is mapped to the pattern, then there is no reason why consciousness
of the talent/pattern should interfere with the ability to exercise it,"
(Holyoak & Thagard, 1995: 224).
In fact, one
might also note that real butterflies cannot properly be said to be conscious
of anything, let alone be the sort of intentional creature whose consciousness
of a particular ability impairs the exercise of that ability. There is indeed an analogical mismatch
between the domain of the man's consciousness of his own talent and the
realistic domain of butterflies. But where
Holyoak & Thagard suggest the passage involves metaphor "extended by
the associative aura created by metonymy," we suggest it prompts a blended
conceptualization of the writer and the butterfly that exploits both metaphoric
and metonymic mappings. The first
sentence, an explicit comparison between the man's talent and the dust on a
butterfly's wings serves to set up the two input spaces for the ensuing blend:
a "human" space with the man and his talent, and a
"butterfly" space with the butterfly and the dust. The blend between the two spaces is prompted
by the second sentence, "At one time he understood it no more than the
butterfly did and he did not know when it was brushed or marred."
Although the
sentence begins by referring to elements in the human space, the focus
gradually shifts to a blended space that concerns a hybrid man/butterfly,
exploiting partial structure from each of the input spaces. For example, the
initial use of the pronoun "he" ("he understood") refers to
the man, while the second refers to the hybrid man/butterfly ("he did not
know when it was brushed or marred.")
The transition to reference to the blended space is mediated by an
ambiguity in the elided phrase "the butterfly did" in "he
understood it no more than the butterfly did." This phrase could be interpreted as a comparison between the
man's understanding of his artistic talent and the butterfly's understanding of
the dust pattern on its wings; or between the man's understanding of his talent
and the butterfly's understanding of the man's talent; or even between the
man's understanding of his talent and the butterfly's understanding of its own
talent. Similarly, the first use of the pronoun "it" (in "he
understood it") refers to the man's talent, while the second (in "he
did not know when it was brushed or marred,") can be understood as
referring alternately to the pattern of dust on the butterfly's wing, the man's
talent, or an element in the blended space with the attributes of both the dust
pattern and the man's talent.
The multiple
interpretations for this sentence can be captured in the conceptual integration
network in figure 2. In the human
space, the man does not understand his artistic talent; in the butterfly space,
the butterfly does not understand the pattern of dust on its wings. In the
blended space, the "he" is a butterfly with the intentional powers of
a human, and the dust pattern is a feature of its wings that it could
potentially understand, but doesn't.
The initial blend conforms well to the first three optimality
principles: integration, topology, and web.
A cognitive model of a butterfly who is not conscious of the dust
pattern on his wings is an integrated representation that is easy to
manipulate. It conforms to the topology principle because the relational
structure in the blended space corresponds to relational structure in the
inputs. Moreover, it conforms to the web principle because the mappings between
elements in the blended space and their counterparts in the input spaces are
consistent.
However, the
third sentence ("Later he became conscious of his damaged wings and of
their construction and he learned to think and he could not fly anymore because
the love of flight was gone and he could only remember when it had been
effortless,") employs slightly different mappings between the elements in
the blend and the inputs, thereby violating the web principle. As Holyoak & Thagard point out, the
man's talent is initially mapped to the dust pattern on the butterfly's wings,
but shifts to the wings themselves.
This violation of the web principle is offset by metonymic tightening,
the pressure to "compress" metonymically related elements in a
blended space. In this case, the
metonymic relationship of adjacency between the butterfly's wings and the dust
pattern licenses a mapping between the man's talent – formerly mapped to the
dust on the wings – and the wings themselves.
The need for a
blended analysis of the third sentence is readily apparent as it makes little
sense to talk about a man "conscious of his damaged wings", nor of a
butterfly who, having lost the love of flight, "could only remember when
it had been effortless." Though
the mapping of the man's talent has shifted from the dust pattern on the wings
to the butterfly's wings themselves, the mapping between the man and the
butterfly remains intact, and the blended space again features a hybrid
creature with the body of a butterfly and the cognitive and emotional capacity
of the man represented in the human space.
With the new mapping scheme established, the blend in the third sentence
satisfies both the web and the topology constraints as the butterfly's wings
continue to map to the man's talent in a systematic way. For example, damaged wings correspond to
fading talent, inability to fly (an action that requires intact wings)
corresponds to the man's inability to employ his talent (viz. writer's block),
and the love of flight (enjoyment in the ability to use the wings for their
intended purpose) corresponds to the man's love of writing (enjoyment in the
ability to exercise his talent).
Though
Hemingway's passage does indeed employ a series of analogical mappings
between conceptual structure taken variously from the domains of butterflies
and humans, it does not set up an analogy between the two domains. That is, Hemingway does not exploit the
reader's knowledge of butterflies to explicate notions pertaining to artistic
talent. Rather, he exploits the reader's
ability to integrate conceptual structure from disparate domains that enable her
to understand and empathize with the aging artist. While the reader may not understand the artist's joy in
practicing his art, she can imagine the thrill of flight. Moreover, having imagined the thrill of
flight, the reader is in a better position to empathize with the loss of this
ability, and consequently its counterpart in the human space, the man's ability
to write. If anything, the analogy is
from the blended conceptualization of the human butterfly to the experience of
the aging artist.
Metonymy is used
here to shift the mapping schema in a way that violates the topology
constraint, but optimizes integration.
The metonymically licensed slip is rhetorically motivated because the
first blend serves the original motivation of explicating the utter
mindlessness of the artist's talent, and the second best serves the rhetorical
motivation of explicating the emotive significance of a whole series of events
as the artist's ability changes over the course of time. This includes the euphoric nature of the
artist exercising his talent, the loss of this ability and the associated
regret, as well as the causal sequence of events that produced the loss of
talent. In subsequent examples we
explore other ways that metonymy licenses different sorts of blends, and the
way in which metonymic mappings affect the interplay of the optimality
principles. In particular, metonymic
language frequently involves conflict of the integration principle with the web
and topology principles.
4. X your own Y
As Coulson (1997,
2000) has argued, the idiom digging your own grave entails much more
than a straightforward mapping from the source domain of "grave
digging" and the target domain of "trouble," primarily because
default interpretations of this idiom lead to the inference that the deeper one
digs the closer one gets to dying, thus positing a direct causal relationship
between grave digging and death where none typically exists. The idiom is also
fantastic in that the grave digger and the corpse in a typical grave digging scenario
both map onto the same element in the blend.
This idiom can be applied to any representation of an individual's
actions interpreted as having untoward consequences for which the speaker
thinks the individual does not foresee. Applicable target situations can
include anything from romantic disaster to academic failure to financial ruin,
as in, "You're digging your own financial grave by investing all your
money in start-up Internet stocks."
Interestingly,
part of the reason this example has been discussed so frequently with respect
to blending theory (e.g., Fauconnier & Turner, 1998; Grady, Oakley, and
Coulson, 1999 to name but two), is that it cannot be accounted for by
approaches to figurative language that involve a strong commitment to the existence
of shared conceptual structure in the source and target domains. Indeed, analysis of the "digging"
example in terms of conceptual blending is motivated by the violation of the
topology principle in the disanalogous mappings that are set up between the
grave digger to the wrongheaded agent in the trouble space, and between the act
of digging and the wrongheaded act (e.g. investing in internet stocks). In accordance with our observations here,
though, this stock example is yet another illustration of the tradeoff between
the topology principle and the integration and unpacking principles. For while the "digging your own
grave" example violates topology, it does fulfill the integration
constraint, allowing the hearer to conceptualize the scenario in an integrated
scene. Moreover, it fulfills the
unpacking principle by utilizing conventional metaphoric mappings between death
and failure (Lakoff & Turner, 1989), holes and situations (Lakoff, 1993),
and a conventional metonymic mapping between graves and death (Turner,
1987). The digger causes the grave,
which maps metonymically onto death, which in turn maps metaphorically onto the
wrongheaded agent's failure. Metaphoric
interpretation of the representation in the blended space thus rests crucially
on the metonymic identification of the grave with death.
4.1 Blowing Your own Horn
A close relative
to digging your own grave is blowing your own horn, both of which
exploit the X-your-own-Y pattern found in non-metaphoric examples, such as
"get your own drink," and "play your own instrument." In
contrast to these conventional examples, and indeed to the digging your own
grave idiom, the own-Y in blowing your own horn is not used in
contradistinction to someone else's horn, but rather playing a horn for
oneself rather than for another.
The horn in this case refers metonymically to the object of the
trumpeting. The puzzling thing about
"blowing your own horn," of course, is how and why blowing your own
horn maps onto praising yourself.
The verb blow and
the noun horn provide the verbal cues for opening a mental space representing
the act of playing a musical instrument.
In this musician space, the focal element "horn" provides the
reference point for accessing and filling other slots in the frame such as musician.
The event represented in this space is the effect associated with producing a
certain kind of sound. The musician
blows into the horn, which produces a distinctive (and loud) sound, which
captures the attention of others (possibly an audience). In fact, in western ceremonies, horn playing
is often a scripted part of a procession, admonishing the crowd to pay
attention. Blowing a horn, in effect,
announces the arrival of a very important person such that the attention of the
crowd becomes fixated on that person.
Just as there is
a close part-whole relation between a musician and her instrument, there is an
even closer part-whole relation between a speaker and her voice. This common part-whole topology establishes
a close relationship between the horn blowing input and the praising input we
call the Encomium space, reminiscent of the formal genre of speech in which the
writer enumerates the achievements and deeds of a living person. Since native speakers of English know that
this idiom is about acts of praising, the mental space activates the focal
element "speaker" and "voice". Once activated, the speaker role and her most relevant feature
map onto the focal elements in the musician space, namely musician and
horn.
The two spaces
are analogically linked by the generic causal and temporal relation obtaining
between distinctive sound produced by a human being and the subsequent effect
it has on other minds. In the musician
space, the musician blows his horn to draw the audience's attention to some notable
occurrence. In the encomium space, the
same relation holds between the vocalized act and the subsequent effect it has
in getting others to pay attention to the accomplishments, deeds, and character
attributed to the individual. This
mapping has been lexicalized in the verb "trumpet" meaning to
praise. In employing a conventional
mapping between encomium and trumpeting, the blend in blowing your own horn
conforms to the unpacking principle.
Conformity to
this entrenched mapping is also evident in the following attested use of the
blowing-your-own-horn blend from a story in the Metropolitan section of the New
York Times from September 22, 1998:
"I firmly believe that if you're doing something interesting,
you ought to tell people about it," Dr. Olivia said. "And if you're blowing your own horn,
do it loudly. There's no sense giving
it a little toot."
In this example,
Dr. Olivia elaborates the blowing-your-own horn blend with a self-conscious
distinction between "blowing" your own horn, and "giving it a
little toot." Focusing on the
loudness-softness gradient, Dr. Olivia suggests a mapping between the manner of
articulation in the blend and the efficacy of the bragging. Soft horn blowing in the blend maps onto
less, and less noticeable praise. This
elaboration suggests a mapping between the degree of praise and the volume of
the trumpet sound – the same mapping that underlies the meaning of the
metaphoric expression "muted praise". This in turn implies a mapping between the praise and the sound,
the speaker and the trumpeter. The
mappings between elements of a typical encomium space and a ritualized space we
call trumpeting royals are listed below.
Typical Trumpeting
Encomium Royals
======== =========
speaker trumpeter
hero royal
praise sound
voice trumpet
But, as noted above, the idiom refers to an
atypical encomium space in which the speaker is the object of his own praise.
Typical Trumpeting Atypical
Encomium Royals Encomium
======== ========= ========
speaker trumpeter speaker
hero royal speaker
praise sound praise
voice trumpet voice
A topology
preserving mapping would proceed as in the following table:
Typical Trumpeting Atypical Atypical
Encomium Royals Encomium Trumpeting
======== ========= ======== ========
speaker trumpeter speaker trumpeter
hero royal speaker trumpeter
praise sound praise sound
voice horn voice horn
In
contrast, the idiom employs a mapping scheme like this:
Typical Trumpeting Atypical Blended
Encomium Royals Encomium Space
======== ========= ======== =========
speaker trumpeter speaker trumpeter
hero royal speaker horn
praise sound praise sound
voice horn voice horn
The violation of
the topology principle inherent in the mapping between the horn in the blended
space and the object of the praise (viz. the speaker) in the atypical encomium
space is supported by a conventional metonymic mapping between musicians and
their instruments, as in "The trombone is at his AA meeting
tonight." Or, an agent talking to
a record producer, "Well, I can get you a drummer, two guitars, and a
bass, but you'll have to find your own horn." As in the examples discussed in previous sections, the metonymic
mapping between horn and trumpeter in blowing your own horn makes it
possible to sustain a metaphoric interpretation of the model in the blended
space despite the violation of the topology constraint.
5. Apocalypse '42
Viktor
Schreckengost's clay sculpture, "Apocalypse '42," features the figure
of death, clothed in a German uniform, riding a horse with Hitler, Hirohito,
and Mussolini as passengers (see figure 3).
Produced in 1942
at the apogee of Axis domination of Europe and Asia, this sculpture represents
the second world war as an instantiation of the Apocalypse. A highly complex
blend involving the allegory of the "Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse"
from the Book of Revelations, personification metaphors of death (i.e., The
Grim Reaper in Judeo-Christian lore), and geopolitical reference,
Schreckengost's clay statue exemplifies pictorially our main point: conceptual
integration relies on metonymic and metaphoric mappings that involve trade-offs
between satisfaction of the integration and topology principles.
Our
analysis begins by considering the two input spaces that prompt the
construction of a third blended space.
Presentation Input Apocalypse
Input Blended Space
============= ============= ===========
4 anthropomorphic figures 4
horsemen 4
anthropomorphic figures
1 equine figure 4 horses 1
equine figure
The first space
is a Presentation space contributing knowledge of artistic medium: clay and
glaze. Specifically this space includes 4 anthropomorphic figures astride a
single equine figure. The Apocalypse space contributes minimal information
about the Four Horsemen from the Book of Revelations, namely that there are
four horses and four horsemen, and that their ride heralds the end of the the world. Viewers more familiar with the
biblical account will open a version of this space that includes knowledge that
the four horsemen are, themselves, personifications of Conquest, War, Plague,
and Famine each of which mounts a horse of a different color: Conquest rides a
white horse; War rides a red horse; Famine rides a black horse; Plague rides a
pale horse. The two input spaces map counterparts onto each other via a
similarity connector, since accessing each space depends on a relation of
resemblance between elements in each space. The established similarity mapping,
in turn, allows referential structure in one space to trigger referential
structure in the other. For instance, Todd can now remark to Seana, "That
hideous mass of clay predicted the end of the world in 1942," since
referring to the medium of representation can provide indirect mental access to
the entity represented.
More interesting
metonymic issues come to light as we consider features of the composed blended
space. In the blend, four anthropomorphic clay figures sit astride a single
equine figure, pictorially representing the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse
quite differently from the way they are represented in the Apocalypse space.
This is due, in part, to material constraints imposed by the Presentation
space, a mental space which determines final material shape of the statue. That
is to say, conceptual integration in this blend works optimally only if the
representations can be compressed into one tightly integrated form. Presenting
four figures astride one horse satisfies this integration constraint, because
it makes efficient use of the presentation space to present an integrated
scene. Moreover, the viewer's attempt
to satisfy the good reason constraint might result in the construction of a
mapping between the integrated horse-and-riders scene as a snapshot of a
singular, coordinated activity.
Satisfying the
integration constraint entails considerable metonymic tightening, such that the
Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse can only afford to ride one horse. As in many
of our examples, conformity to the integration principle comes at the expense
of a violation of the topology principle. In the blend, the precise allegorical
interpretation of the four horsemen is not important, and the metonymic
relationship between color and symbolized evil (i.e., the coupling of
"red" with "war") obtaining in the Apocalypse space is
incidental in the blended space. In the blend, for instance, Death is riding a
black horse with a red mane and tail, not a pale horse. In Schreckengost's
sculpture, the color correspondences occur only incidentally.
"Whiteness," for instance, is not a property of the horse but of
three riders: Death's face, Hitler's and Mussolini's head and arms) and their
accouterments (i.e., the Japanese flag). Similarly, "paleness" is not
a property of the horse but of Mussolini. In the composed blend, the
color-horse-rider topology from the Apocalypse space get "metonymically
loosened," suggesting that the such color metonymy functions in this CIN
as incidental topology (see Fauconnier & Turner 1998).
Above, we focused
on the material conditions governing the composition of a conceptual blend made
manifest in a medium requiring great economy of space. Below we complete our
analysis by considering the referential import of the figures themselves. By
our analysis, three input spaces feed the completed blend.
Apocalypse
Space
==========
Conquest
White Horse
War
Red Horse
Plague
Pale Horse
Famine
Black Horse
Time: End of
Time
Goal: End
Humanity
Axis Space
====
Germany
Hitler
Italy
Mussolini
Japan
Hirohito
Time: 1942
Goal: World
Domination
Death Space
====
Figure of
Death
(i.e., Grim
Reaper)
Goal: Cause
Death
Blended
Space
====
Hitler
Mussolini
Hirohito
Japanese
Flag
Figure of
Death
Missile
Horse
Time: 1942
Goal: World
Domination & End of Humanity
The Axis Powers
space is structured gradually as the viewer identifies the figures in the
statue as Adolph Hitler, Benito Mussolini, and emperor Hirohito. In mental spaces nomenclature, each clay
figure from the Presentation space maps onto each referent in the Axis Powers
space by a similarity connector. Once this iconic relationship is established,
viewers produce a value-role mapping as each is construed as the leader of his
respective country: Hitler is Leader of Germany, Mussolini
is Leader of Italy, and Hirohito is Emperor of Japan. The Axis Powers space represents the figures
as intentional agents acting in coordination with one another. In this space,
each leader stands metonymically for each nation, which, in turn, is understood
as part of a corporate entity: a political alliance. Interpreters familiar with
modern European history will access relevant background knowledge about the
Axis Nations, such as the fact that the first 1936 alliance between Germany and
Italy (known as the Rome-Berlin Axis) followed by a second 1940 alliance with
Japan and, tangentially with Hungary, Finland, Bulgaria, and Romania. In the
Axis Powers space, the individual nations act as one group.
With the blended
construal, the formal features of the sculpture take on new significance. For example, the interpreter may understand
the referent scene as an alliance wherein the single horse stands for the Axis
Powers, and the singular, coordinated event stands for the intentions and
actions of each nation under the alliance. In the blend, but in none of the
input spaces, riding the horse stands for the sustained, coordinated effort of
the three principal nations to conquer the world, an inference licensed by the
leader for nation metonymy.
Consequently, the interpreter does not only see Hitler, Mussolini, and
Hirohito riding the horse, she sees Germany, Italy, and Japan acting together
in a military alliance.
Although the
statue involves integration of conceptual structure from the apocalypse space
with that in the Axis Powers space, three of the four horses from the
apocalypse input are omitted from the blended space. This occurs because of positive pressure to accommodate structure
from the Axis Powers space, as well as an absence of pressure to preserve the
precise topology of the Apocalypse space.
In the blend, as in the Axis space it projects to, the corporate actions
of the Axis powers manifest all the evils of the apocalypse in one political
alliance. The image of the three axis
leaders riding a single horse in the blend can be mapped onto their coordinated
actions in the military alliance.
Moreover, while the knowledge that the four horsemen of the apocalypse
herald the end of the world is important for producing the inferential
implications of the blend, the establishment of a precise mapping between
particular leaders and particular horsemen of the apocalypse is not. Consequently, there is no need to preserve
the metonymic mapping between horse color and personified evil, noted above in
our discussion of conformity to the "good reason" constraint.
The blend
represents world conquest in terms of horseback riding, thus compressing the
complex chain of events involving millions of people to a much more human scale
activity involving four people and a horse. Moreover, the completed blend
presents a dynamic event whereby the Axis powers ride the horse of the
apocalypse. The completed blend also
takes on a distinct temporal dimension, wherein the activities of the horse and
the horsemen are playing out in 1942. At this point, the meaning of the
sculpture's base takes on new significance. With respect to the presentation
space the base is purely functional, allowing the sculptor to display his
figures with proper perspective. But once the interpreter recognizes that the
base is the entire Northern hemisphere, she completes the blend in which the
leaders of the Axis nations are currently conquering the entire Northern
hemisphere, which, in effect, stands for Western civilization itself.
We have chosen to
deal lastly with the most salient figure in the sculpture: Death. In the
sculpture, death wears a German uniform, and appears to be the figure actually
riding the horse (the others appear as passengers). The Interpreter recognizes
the figure as death because its face appears as a skull, thus prompting the
well-established metonymic compression of cause and effect, where the effect of
corporal decomposition comes to stand for its own cause, death. As Turner
(1987, 1991, 1996) has noted, the figure of the grim reaper is an example of
the Generic is Specific mapping (i.e., death heralds the death of an
individual). The mere presence of death among these figures heralds the death
of the West as we know it, a very salient and plausible scenario in 1942. The introduction
of death as the fourth horsemen comes about by virtue of metonymic attribution
to Death of elements from other mental spaces in the blend. In our account, the
presence of Death in the Apocalypse space automatically opens a mental space
for representations of Death as the "Grim Reaper," the common
representation of death in Judeo- Christian lore.
It would be odd,
however, to represent death in his traditional priestly cowl, robe, and scythe.
Instead, Schreckengost represents him in a German uniform, carrying a missile
in his right hand. It seems that to bring in wholesale the figure of death
means violating the unpacking constraint, insofar as typical personifications
of Death space come "packaged" with the features just described. In
this instance, violating the unpacking constraint satisfies the good reason
constraint. A priestly cowl and scythe do not have the same degree of
geopolitical relevance in 1942 as a German uniform and bomb do. The fact that
death has to be wearing something means that clothing and accessories can be
projected from any mental space in the network. It happens that Death's
appearance exploits metonymic relations established in the Axis power’s space,
such that military uniform and bomb can stand for both instruments
of war and effects of the war. Satisfying the good reason
constraint, in turn, optimizes integration.
Why? We already
know that Schreckengost has to choose a fourth horseman to complete his
allegorical allusion, but unless he is going to introduce, for instance, the
leader of Hungary or Romania or Bulgaria or Finland (none of whom are
particularly notorious), he must choose a figure that does not violate the
topology of the Axis Powers space. Stalin, for instance, would have been an
appropriately menacing choice (even in 1942), but would have disintegrated the
corporate image, since Stalin and Russia were enemies to the Axis Nations.
Choosing the personification of Death as the fourth horseman (i) is
appropriately menacing, (ii) preserves specific topology of the Apocalypse
space, and (iii) does not violate the topological relations recruited from the
Axis Powers space.
This brings us to
the central ambiguity of the piece. Who is responsible for the apocalypse? Like
death, the four horsemen are carrying out a divine plan for the end of the
world. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, especially, Death is personified as a
herald of death, and its heralding is understood to be the proximate cause of
an individual's death. In other words, Death is not acting of his own volition
(in fact, it is not clear that death has any volition at all), it is merely
acting out a divine mandate. But, is
the interpreter to suppose that Hitler, Hirohito, and Mussolini, as agents of
the apocalypse, are also executing a divine plan? Schreckengost's own
commentary suggests as much, when he writes, "In the Four Horsemen of the
Apocalypse . . . I saw a strange
resemblance to the four beasts let loose on the world today" (Adams 2000:
61).
References to the four beasts, then, refer
to the leaders, with death representing the results of their actions; however,
Scheckengost's use of the quasi-modal verb phrase "let loose"
suggests a more powerful entity permitting them to act, lifting the barrier
that holds them from the rest of the world. That an external and more powerful
entity is being referred to is not in question. What is in question is what or
who is the ultimate instigator of these events? Is it God? Or, is it the sum
total of human actions-- including World War I, the Treaty of Versailles, the
collapse of the Weimar Republic in 1933, the United State's territorial control
over Hawaii, Chamberlain's policy of appeasement, and so on--that brought forth
these beasts? Or, is it some combination of human folly and divine retribution?
All of these are plausible interpretations for metaphoric and metonymic
mappings.
As complexity
increases, trade-offs between optimality principles become inevitable.
Comprehending Schreckengost's sculpture involves maintaining certain
topological relations from the Apocalypse and Axis Powers spaces such that a
total of four horsemen appear and that three of them represent the leaders of
the Axis Powers Nations. The final blend integrates the biblical and the
historical by preserving these topological relations. However, other
topological relations, such as the precise analogical mappings between horse's
color, personified evil as rider, and political figure, are not preserved in
the blend.
6. Conclusion
As a general
model of meaning construction, blending theory posits a small set of partially
compositional processes that operate on and constrain a diverse range of
semantic and pragmatic phenomena from many different sign systems. Our purpose
in this essay was to show how metonymy operates over diverse instances of
conceptual blending, as manifest in everyday language use, crafted literary
artifacts, and modernist representational sculpture. One consistent finding was
the role metonymy seems to play in satisfying different and competing
optimality principles during comprehension. For instance, we found that
metonymic inference usually facilitates integration at the expense of
preserving specific topology, as when the properties of Coca Cola (i.e. flowing
liquid) can be used to make sense of phenomena such as the Coca Cola
corporation's profits, that are not normally characterized by such properties;
or, when Hemingway exploits the reader's ability to integrate information about
butterflies and writers to build a sympathetic composite portrait of the aging
artist; or, when the a horn actually becomes the object of praise
with blowing your own horn. Similarly, some of the other optimality
principles, such as good reason, exploit metonymic inference to facilitate
integration, but do so by concomitantly preserving topology at higher levels of
abstraction, as when the figure of Death trades its usual robe and cowl for a
German uniform in Schreckengost's apocalyptic fantasy.
These analyses
suggest that meaningful acts are not always supported by orderly structures with
neat analogical mappings between domains, but, rather, unruly, ad hoc,
conglomerations that, nonetheless, adhere to a few basic principles which
Fauconnier and Turner have labeled optimality constraints. By focusing on expressions that employ both
metaphor and metonymy, we have attempted to show how the two sorts of mappings
can be used to combine structure in novel ways. Though such examples often violate the topology principle, that
is, the pressure to preserve shared relational structure, they do so in order
to promote the construction of an integrated mental scene useful for the
projection of inferences. In general,
the presence of metonymic connections allows us to maintain connections between
networks of mental spaces comprised of opportunistic juxtapositions of
conceptual structure from distally related domains, that nonetheless appear to
be important for reasoning.
Understanding the role metonymy plays in this process is thus crucial
for understanding how human beings make meaningful things.